What Country Does Abelardo Want to Build? The 4 Ideas Behind His First Speech

Beyond the Promises: The Question Abelardo Actually Answered

Castro states his position from the start: he voted for Abelardo, and has no problem acknowledging it. Precisely for that reason, he does not want to turn this episode into a celebration of the speech. He wants to understand what was really promised, where he sees opportunities, where he finds risks, and what Colombians will have the right to demand in four years.

Because winning the presidency is one thing. Governing is something else entirely.

From that perspective, Abelardo's inaugural speech is not simply a list of promises. It is a political contract with Colombia: the explanation Abelardo gave the country about the kind of president he intends to be and the kind of Colombia he says he wants to build. And Castro identifies four theses that together form a fairly coherent governing philosophy.

Thesis One: Reclaiming the State's Monopoly on Authority

The first thesis might look like a simple security promise. Castro believes it is much deeper. The real question is: who actually governs within Colombian territory? And to what extent do zones exist where the State appears officially on the maps, but in practice shares or has even ceded authority to criminal armed organizations?

Consider a municipality where a business owner has to pay extortion to open their shop. A farmer needs permission from an armed group to move around. An illegal organization decides who can engage in politics or who can enter a given territory. There may be a mayor's office, a police station, and a Colombian flag in the plaza. But the real question remains: who exercises authority there?

Abelardo proposes a different logic from the previous government: submit to the law or face the legitimate force of the State. That represents an important break with the idea of sitting the State and certain criminal structures down in a negotiation that could be perceived as a conversation between two equivalent powers.

But the promise carries a limit that will need to be watched over the next four years.

One of Abelardo's greatest tests will be showing he can use the full legitimate force of the State against criminal organizations while simultaneously respecting the limits of his own power. He can strengthen the armed forces and recover territory — but he also has to be capable of respecting a judicial ruling he dislikes or a congressional decision that contradicts his interests.

The question for four years from now: who actually governs Colombian territory — the State or the criminal armed groups?

Thesis Two: The Economy Is Driven by Society, Not the State

The second great thesis is not simply about lowering taxes or reducing public spending. Behind those proposals sits a much more important question: who should be the main engine of the Colombian economy — the State, or citizens and businesses?

One vision sees the State playing an ever-larger role in the economy: intervening, regulating, redistributing, subsidizing, and directly participating in different sectors. The vision Abelardo presents starts from a different point: the State should create stable conditions and fulfill certain essential functions, while workers, entrepreneurs, business owners, and investors are the ones who produce most of the wealth.

Castro warns that it would be too superficial to summarize this as simply wanting to reduce the size of the State. The more interesting question is: what should the State actually do, and what should it stop trying to do?

Because Colombia is not a company. A government cannot abandon a community because serving it generates no profit, nor can it skip building a road because it does not produce sufficient financial return. There are functions that necessarily belong to the State.

So Castro interprets Abelardo's proposal as the pursuit of a state less prominent in the direct creation of wealth, but more effective at essential functions: security, justice, infrastructure, education, healthcare, social protection, and clear rules. After meeting those functions, the thesis is to allow society to be the one that produces.

And here a fundamental word from the speech appears: trust. The business owner trusts when the rules are not going to change every six months. The investor trusts when contracts will be honored. The citizen trusts when they perceive that their taxes are not wasted on corruption or unnecessary bureaucracy. Trust cannot be decreed.

The question for the year 2030: did Colombia produce more wealth thanks to a more efficient state, or did it simply end up with less state?

Thesis Three: Real Power to the Regions — and Meritocracy

Colombia is constitutionally defined as a decentralized republic, but an enormous number of decisions still pass through Bogotá. Resources, ministries, permits, projects, and significant investments continue to depend largely on the central government. And mayors who know their municipalities' problems perfectly still have to travel to Bogotá and knock on different doors to resolve something happening hundreds of kilometers from the capital.

If Abelardo is serious about returning power to the regions, his proposal cannot simply be sending more money. Decentralizing means transferring real capacity to make decisions. If a municipality receives new responsibilities but no resources, true decentralization does not exist. And if it receives resources but the important decisions continue depending on Bogotá, we are not talking about deep change.

But that idea also carries risks. Colombia does not have the same institutional capacity across all its territories. Transferring greater resources and responsibilities to a city with relatively strong institutions is very different from doing the same in small municipalities with little technical capacity, weak controls, and administrations that can easily be captured by regional political groups. That is why decentralization must be accompanied by the transfer of accountability, technical capacity, and fiscal responsibility.

And here another directly connected promise appears: meritocracy. Abelardo spoke of placing capable people at the helm of the State and reducing the use of public positions as political currency. The problem is that this promise will be much easier to make during an inauguration than when congressional votes are needed.

The real test will come when Abelardo has to choose between keeping his meritocracy promise or using traditional mechanisms to build governability. Castro clarifies that not all political negotiation is clientelism — parties exist and coalitions exist. The problem begins when the question stops being "who is the right person for this position?" and starts becoming "to whom do I owe this position?"

The two questions to evaluate this thesis: Do the regions actually make more decisions, or does Bogotá continue deciding for them? Did Abelardo govern with the most capable people, or did he end up governing with the people he politically needed?

Thesis Four: The Cultural Battle and the Limits of Power

The fourth thesis is probably the hardest to measure. We can measure security, investment, public spending, or decentralization. But there is a part of Abelardo's speech that does not fit easily inside a spreadsheet — it has to do with values, family, homeland, religion, authority, freedom, individual responsibility, and identity.

After listening to the complete speech, Castro does not believe Abelardo is only proposing to change specific public policies. He is also proposing to change part of Colombia's cultural conversation. The idea is that some of Colombia's problems are not exclusively economic or institutional but also cultural: related to the loss of authority, individual responsibility, a sense of belonging, family, and certain moral reference points.

There Castro finds an important break with Gustavo Petro — though not simply because one is left and the other right. Petro also waged a cultural battle: around the environment, minorities, history, identity, social justice, and new ways of understanding economic and political relationships. Abelardo seems to be proposing moving that pendulum in a different direction. That is part of a democracy.

But Castro marks the limit: promoting values is not the same as imposing a single way of living them.

Abelardo has every right to speak about God, express his faith, and explain his convictions. But he is also president of those who practice other religions and of those who believe in none. His faith may guide his personal decisions, but the State must continue operating within the Constitution and guaranteeing the same rights for all.

The same applies to patriotism. A government can promote strong families and restore a sense of national belonging — but that patriotism cannot become a division between good and bad Colombians based on which political party they support.

Finally, all of this connects to another idea that appears constantly in the speech: individual responsibility. Abelardo seems to envision a citizen who works, produces, obeys the law, cares for their family, and understands that exercising freedom also means taking responsibility for their own decisions.

When Castro began preparing this episode, he thought he was going to analyze a presidential speech. After reviewing it, he found something more interesting: a kind of political contract with Colombia. The explanation Abelardo gave the country about what kind of president he intends to be and what kind of Colombia he says he wants to build.

A president should not be evaluated by the beauty of his speech, the quantity of applause he received, or the number of promises he made. He should be evaluated by the distance between what was promised and what was finally delivered. And that distance is exactly what Castro intends to measure over the next four years.