August 10, 2026. The ground shakes at a magnitude of 7.4. Abelardo de la Espriella has been president of Colombia for exactly 72 hours. He is still forming his cabinet, making appointments, learning what the country's finances actually look like. And in that moment — before he has finished sitting down — Colombia demands answers.
In this episode, George Castro does something rare in the middle of a national tragedy: separates the questions. Not to defend Abelardo. Not to attack him. To hold him accountable for what is his — and to ask who answers for what he found.
Three Days and an Earthquake: The Distinction That Changes Everything
On August 7, 2026, Abelardo de la Espriella was inaugurated as President of Colombia. Three days later, on August 10, a 7.4-magnitude earthquake struck. Preliminary losses were estimated at around 30 trillion pesos in buildings and infrastructure: homes, hospitals, schools, roads, water systems, airports.
Since that moment, Colombia has been having two parallel conversations. One about form — the smiles, the hugs, the footage distributing soccer balls in Buenaventura. Another about substance: where will the money come from to rebuild Colombia?
Castro establishes from the start the analytical framework that will hold throughout the episode: what Abelardo inherited must be separated from what he is doing with what he inherited. They are different responsibilities and deserve different questions.
This is not a grace period. From the moment he took the presidential oath, the constitutional responsibility was in his hands. It may be the worst welcome imaginable — it may be deeply unfair — but that is why a president is elected: to govern even when things go wrong.
Where Was the Money? UNGRD Resources and the Difference Between Having and Being Able to Use
After the earthquake, two completely opposing narratives emerged. Those who support Abelardo say Petro left the treasury empty. Those who defend the previous government say Abelardo is looking for an excuse. Castro doesn't automatically believe either one. There are documents.
During the Petro government itself, it had already been officially acknowledged that the national budget allocation for contingencies and disasters was insufficient. That allocation was approximately 668.421 billion pesos — and the same document noted that those resources were already appropriated and committed by the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres in prior reconstructions, housing, machinery, and humanitarian assistance.
The distinction matters. Money recorded in a fund is not the same as money available to deploy immediately. Castro illustrates this with a direct analogy: if your bank account shows $10,000 but part of it covers your mortgage, another part goes to taxes, and another to obligations already acquired, you technically have $10,000 — but you cannot take that $10,000 to handle an emergency tomorrow. That is exactly what Colombia faced on August 10.
Carlos Carrillo, former UNGRD director under the Petro government, argued that a catastrophe of this scale would have forced any government to seek extraordinary financing. Castro agrees on that point: it would be absurd to think Colombia should have had 30 trillion pesos sitting in an account waiting for an earthquake to happen. But he also notes that both things can be true at the same time.
The legitimate question is not whether Petro stole the emergency funds — Castro says explicitly he has no evidence for that. The legitimate question is different: why did Colombia arrive at August 10 with such limited financial capacity to face a major catastrophe?
Not All Debt Is Equal: Abelardo's First Major Economic Test
Abelardo campaigned on austerity, reducing spending, and controlling the national debt. He begins his presidency facing an emergency that likely requires exactly the opposite: more resources and possibly more borrowing.
And here Castro introduces a distinction that gets lost in the political noise: not all debt is equal. Getting into debt permanently because the state spends more than it takes in is one thing. Seeking extraordinary financing to rebuild a country after a catastrophe is something else entirely. Castro illustrates this with the same domestic logic: if you were cutting expenses and a fire destroys part of your home, no one expects you to leave it destroyed because you promised not to borrow. You'll use savings, file an insurance claim, cut other spending, ask for help — and possibly seek financing.
The responsible question, then, is not simply whether Abelardo is going to take on debt. It is: for what? How much? Under what conditions? For what term? How does he plan to pay it back?
The World Bank is already listed as a source of support for the response and recovery. The government declared a state of economic, social, and ecological emergency, granting extraordinary tools to contract and execute faster. But Castro marks a clear warning: speed does not mean the absence of controls. Precisely during an emergency — when the government needs to contract and disburse quickly — oversight must be even greater. Extraordinary powers have limits, and every peso allocated to reconstruction must be auditable.
From the opposition, Gustavo Petro and Iván Cepeda have raised the possibility of increasing taxation to help finance reconstruction. Castro does not dismiss the discussion just because it comes from Petro — it must be analyzed. More debt has consequences. More taxes also has consequences. Cutting other budgets has costs. International cooperation has limits. The solution will probably be a combination of several alternatives. But what is needed is not slogans: numbers are needed.
And Castro invokes a reference Colombia should not forget: the 1999 Eje Cafetero earthquake, when a special scheme was created to administer the reconstruction. This tragedy can become the first major demonstration of how Abelardo intends to govern — a transparent model, with permanent auditing, private participation, international cooperation, public information, and measurable results.
Form Also Matters: Communicating a Tragedy Is Governing
So far the episode has addressed budgets, debt, and institutions. But governing a tragedy does not consist solely of managing money. It also means emotionally representing a country that is suffering.
And here Castro says something that makes it uncomfortable for those who want to defend Abelardo without nuance: he does have things to review. The images of smiles, hugs, and distributing soccer balls to children in affected areas drew criticism. Castro separates the gesture from the context.
When families are searching for missing relatives, when the country is learning the death toll, and thousands of people have just lost everything they built over a lifetime, the president must understand that every gesture communicates — especially when it comes from him. He may have the best intentions in the world. But if the image that reaches a displaced family is a smiling president distributing soccer balls while they are asking themselves where they will sleep that night, there is a communication problem.
And that problem does belong to Abelardo. Not to Petro. Not to the budget he inherited. Not to the previous UNGRD administration. To him.
Being fair to Abelardo for the conditions he inherited does not mean justifying everything he does. From the moment he put on the presidential sash, his leadership, his communication, and his ability to emotionally understand his country are his responsibility.
The Real Exam Has Not Even Begun: Did They Deliver?
Is Abelardo de la Espriella mishandling the crisis? Castro's answer at that moment was that it was still too soon to know. Very little time had passed. The full scale of the damage was still being mapped. Many of the economic decisions being made could only be evaluated months later.
But the separation of responsibilities can begin. The earthquake is not Abelardo's responsibility. The fiscal conditions he found three days after taking office were not created by him. That does not mean everything can be automatically attributed to Petro — a catastrophe of that magnitude would have forced any government to seek extraordinary financing. But from August 10 onward, the response belongs to Abelardo.
Reconstruction is not measured by how many zones the president visited or how many times he appeared on television. It is measured by asking: How many homes were rebuilt? How many schools reopened? How many hospitals were restored? What did it cost and how long did it take? How much money was lost to mismanagement or corruption?
Castro closes with a statement that transcends technical analysis. He hopes Abelardo succeeds — not because he is Abelardo, not because he is on the right, not because anyone voted for him. He hopes he succeeds because Colombia needs him to succeed. Hoping that a president fails in the middle of a tragedy just to prove a political point is, at its core, hoping the country fails.
Criticize what must be criticized. Investigate what must be investigated. Watch every contract, every loan, every peso. But in the middle of a national tragedy there should be something above Petro, above Abelardo, above the left and above the right: Colombia.
Castro saves this episode to return to it. In six months or a year, it will be time to revisit the promises, revisit the numbers, and ask a very simple but very important question: Did they deliver?
George Castro is a Colombian-American political analyst, entrepreneur, and one of the most influential figures in the Colombian community in the United States. For decades, he has played a prominent role in civic, business, and community life, bringing together political, diplomatic, institutional, and community leaders from Colombia and the United States while remaining actively involved in issues that matter to Colombians both inside and outside the country. As the creator of @CastrosCommonSense, Castro brings that experience to a platform for direct and independent analysis of politics, the economy, and the major issues affecting Colombia. His approach seeks to move beyond slogans and partisan loyalties to provide context, judgment, and common sense to Colombians wherever they live.
Subscribe to the channel →