Some governments take months to show what their real priorities are. Abelardo de la Espreella's seems to need considerably less time. Within days, Colombia has seen large-scale military operations, strikes against criminal armed structures, and security forces that appear to be receiving a different order: recover the initiative.
One of the blows has a name: Bendito Menor. Two operations in two different regions. But behind them, a single message seems to be emerging. And this is where the topic stops being just a public order news story. Because one operation can be circumstantial. Two can begin to show a trend. But when those operations come alongside presidential rhetoric about recovering territory, we have to ask whether we are watching something bigger. Is a new security doctrine being born in Colombia?
The Change Is Not in the Operations — It's in the Political Order
It would be too easy to say "Abelardo arrived and military operations began." That would not be accurate. Colombia has always had armed forces, police and intelligence, and airstrikes, arrests and operations against criminal organizations have happened under different governments.
The change is not simply that operations are happening. The change appears to be in the political order, the priority, the rhythm and the objective the president is setting. Abelardo's government does not propose opening a negotiating table as its first response to these organizations. The order being transmitted is to recover control of Colombian territory using the legitimate force of the State.
Castro makes an important distinction: those figures are the government's official balance, and one month of statistics is not enough to declare victory. But it is enough to observe a direction. And probably the most important element is that the government is targeting commanders — not just foot soldiers, not just shipments. It is attempting to strike command structures.
There is another characteristic Castro considers particularly important: the president is personally assuming security policy. He is not leaving it solely in the hands of the defense minister. He is seen always with a radio in hand, turning each major operation into a political message. That carries advantages — backing and mission clarity for the security forces, a signal that a chain of command exists — but it also means something more: the results and the mistakes will be his as well.
Bendito Menor: What One Case Tells Us About the New Doctrine
The case of Nain Andrés Pérez Toncel, alias Bendito Menor, matters not only because of who this criminal was, but because of what he represents within the new strategy.
Formally recognized as a representative member of the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada within a socio-juridical dialogue process. The intent was to verify whether there was a willingness to transition toward legality.
Converted into a high-value target from virtually the first day of the presidency. Operation Centinela de la Patria — DIJÍN intelligence located him in Riohacha. Result: Pérez Toncel killed in confrontation. Arrest warrants for homicide, kidnapping, extortion; Interpol red notice.
The contrast is the point. The same man who sat in a State-sponsored dialogue ended up being turned by the new government into a high-value target. And the operation also had an important symbolic dimension: Bendito Menor had built a public image around his criminal life — social media, motorcycles, weapons, jewelry, narcocorridos. He wasn't just hiding from the State; he was projecting power to the community. For months the message seemed to be "Here I am." The State's response turned out to be: "We will find you."
After the operation, the president said something that summarizes his philosophy better than any policy document: "When the State decides, criminals always lose."
The Mistake No Government Can Afford: Confusing Body Counts with Security
Here Castro identifies the most dangerous temptation for any government that achieves quick military results: confusing the elimination of commanders with solving the problem. They are not the same thing.
Criminal organizations always have replacements. They have financial structures, routes, contacts and weapons. And in some territories they have something even harder to fight: social control. Bendito Menor's funeral was accompanied by narcocorridos, celebratory gunshots and open admiration for the criminal. For Castro, that is one of the most important pieces of news in the entire story — not just that Bendito Menor died, but that after his death there were people willing to celebrate what he represented.
That is why Castro proposes that the real indicator is not the lists of crossed-out aliases. The real question is: who controls the territory after the operation? If tomorrow another man occupies exactly Bendito Menor's place, the State won an operation but not necessarily the recovery of the territory. If the commander's name changes but the same narcotrafficking routes continue, we won an operation — not the war against the criminal structure.
This means "Abelardo goes all-in" cannot mean just more airstrikes, more casualties, more photographs. It has to mean intelligence, justice, territorial control, pursuing the money, protecting the population and permanent State presence after the soldiers leave. Because it does nothing to recover the municipality on Monday if the armed group comes back on Friday.
How Far Can Abelardo Go? Authority Without Authoritarianism
If the answer to the episode's central question is that yes, Abelardo is going all-in, then another question must be asked immediately: how far can he go? And the answer should be clear: as far as the Constitution allows, as far as the law allows, and as far as a democratic State can legitimately use its force.
✓ Authority: the legitimate force of the State within the parameters of the law. It strengthens a democracy.
✗ Authoritarianism: power without control. It can affect and destroy a democracy.
✓ Strong State: implacable toward those who threaten citizens, but absolutely subject to the law when exercising its power. "The State has rules; the criminal has no rules."
This debate has already stopped being theoretical. In these first weeks, there are airstrikes with minors recruited inside criminal structures, judicial decisions beginning to set limits, and questions about how the government communicates certain operations.
The dilemma of minors is one of the hardest any military force can face. The criminal who recruits a child bears responsibility for placing that child there — that must be absolutely clear. But that child is also the victim of a crime. It cannot be resolved with a five-word slogan. It requires intelligence, protocols, rules of engagement, accountability and difficult decisions.
But Castro also refuses the other extreme: the recruitment of minors cannot be allowed to become a shield of impunity for criminal organizations. If the incentive becomes "I recruit children, I position them around my structures, and I automatically create a zone where the State cannot enter," that cannot happen either. The right question is not "bomb everything" or "don't touch anyone" — it is how a strong, precise and lawful State acts.
The Real Metric: Are Colombians Safer?
Castro accepts the first-month results for what they are: official data from a period far too short to draw definitive conclusions. He will not make the mistake of declaring success after 30 days. But he will not make the opposite mistake either: ignoring results simply because of who is governing. If results exist, they must be acknowledged. If mistakes appear, they should be pointed out constructively.
Backing the security forces is necessary, but it cannot become a blank check. A good commander needs support, but also needs rules. A soldier needs to know his government will back him always and only when he acts correctly and within the law — but also needs to know exactly where the limits are. And a strong president does not show weakness by acknowledging a mistake, but does show leadership.
That is why the phrase that should define this strategy is not simply "iron fist" — Castro finds it too small. He would prefer strong State. A strong State has capable armed forces, but also independent judges, prosecutors, functioning prisons, pursues the money, controls borders, protects children, recovers territory and after recovering it, stays — it does not leave. That is the difference.
Is Abelardo going all-in? At this moment, Castro would say yes. His government is sending an offensive signal. The security forces are acting. Commanders are being pursued. The president has decided to make security one of the central priorities of his administration — and he is doing what he promised during his campaign. That deserves recognition.
But four years are far harder than thirty days. The real test will not be starting an offensive. It will be sustaining a security policy without losing effectiveness, without losing legitimacy, and without losing the rule of law. Because Colombia already knows both extremes: the cost of a State too weak to protect its citizens, and the dangers that emerge when in the name of fighting the enemy someone starts to believe the rules are an obstacle. We need neither one.
George Castro is a Colombian-American political analyst, entrepreneur, and one of the most influential figures in the Colombian community in the United States. For decades, he has played a prominent role in civic, business, and community life, bringing together political, diplomatic, institutional, and community leaders from Colombia and the United States while remaining actively involved in issues that matter to Colombians both inside and outside the country. As the creator of @CastrosCommonSense, Castro brings that experience to a platform for direct and independent analysis of politics, the economy, and the major issues affecting Colombia. His approach seeks to move beyond slogans and partisan loyalties to provide context, judgment, and common sense to Colombians wherever they live.
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