Donald Trump has a new ally in Latin America, and its name is Colombia. Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State, visited Colombia as part of a tour that also included Ecuador and Peru — arriving less than two months after the inauguration of President Abelardo de la Espreella. When the Secretary of State arrives that quickly, it is not a courtesy call.
The official agenda already offers some clues: narcoterrorism, commerce, cooperation, and U.S. support following the earthquake — Washington has already committed $26.5 million in emergency humanitarian assistance, plus search and rescue teams and C130 aircraft support. But Castro wants to go beyond the official agenda and ask the question that matters: what does Trump want from Colombia?
What Does the United States Want? Washington's Three Priorities
There is no need to speculate. Washington has already put its priorities on the table, and Castro summarizes them in three: security, narcoterrorism, and commerce.
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Security
Colombia has something that cannot be changed: its geography. It is the gateway between South and Central America, with coastlines on both the Caribbean and the Pacific, a border with Venezuela, and a central position on drug trafficking routes. That makes Colombia a strategic partner for Washington regardless of who governs. With Abelardo, cooperation is accelerating: the Southern Command chief has already been in Colombia, meetings with the military have taken place, intelligence cooperation is underway, and Colombia has already joined a new regional strategy against the cartels.
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Narcoterrorism
Washington is not just talking about drugs. It is deliberately using the term "narcoterrorism" — and that matters, because it changes how the problem is understood. It is no longer just about how many tons of cocaine leave Colombia. It is about criminal organizations, territorial control, weapons, borders, criminal financing, and regional security. Trump wants results: less cocaine reaching the United States, reduced criminal capacity among the cartels, greater territorial control.
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Commerce
The third interest is economic. The United States wants a deeper trade relationship: to sell, invest, access markets, and have reliable supply chains. But something interesting happens here — commerce means different things to Colombia and to the United States. The U.S. wants to sell and export to Colombia. Colombia wants exactly the same, but toward the United States. And that is where the first real negotiating point emerges.
"Trump does not simply need a Colombian president he gets along with. He needs a partner — a security partner, a partner in the fight against drug trafficking, an economic partner."
Why Colombia Is Not Just Any Country — and Why Washington Is Not Optional
Before getting to what Colombia should ask for, Castro makes an important clarification: when two countries sit down to negotiate, both want something. That is not a problem. It is foreign policy. The mistake would be thinking that an international relationship means one country simply does what the other wants.
What Colombia Has That Washington Needs
Exceptional strategic geographic position. Simultaneous access to the Caribbean and Pacific. Border with Venezuela. Central position on drug trafficking routes. Decades of military cooperation. One of South America's most important economies. Colombia has never been just any country for Washington.
What Colombia Needs from Washington
Investment. Market access. Security cooperation. Technology. Intelligence. And right now there is a very concrete issue on the table: tariffs. President Abelardo already personally asked Rubio for a temporary suspension of tariffs on Colombian products.
The political closeness that exists today between the two governments did not exist before. Trump has already spoken favorably of President Abelardo. Rubio had already spoken with him before the official visit. U.S. officials had already visited Colombia. Castro believes this meeting could be the beginning of a redefinition of the relationship between the two countries — and that is where the difficult questions arise.
What Colombia Should Put on the Table: Trade, Investment, Security, Reconstruction
An alliance does not consist only of asking what Washington wants. It also means asking what Colombia can gain in this process. Castro identifies four Colombian interests that should be explicitly on the table.
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Trade and Tariffs
Colombia already has a concrete request: the temporary suspension of tariffs affecting Colombian products — one that President Abelardo made directly to Rubio and that led to sending the commerce minister to Washington. If the United States wants to deepen the trade relationship, Colombia can respond: let us open the market more, facilitate our exports, protect our businesspeople and use this new relationship to sell more Colombian products in the United States.
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Investment
If Colombia is to become once again a strategic ally of Washington, that relationship should produce real economic results: U.S. capital, new companies, infrastructure, technology, energy, and jobs. This is not about Rubio arriving with a checkbook — it is about using a strong political relationship to build a stronger economic one. The State Department itself has listed deepening commercial relations among the objectives of this trip.
3
Reciprocal Security Cooperation
If Washington wants Colombia to be one of its main partners in fighting drug trafficking, Colombia should demand effective cooperation in return: technology, radars, intelligence, air capacity, maritime control, training, and equipment. Combating criminal organizations that move billions of dollars costs enormous amounts of money — and if the problem is shared, the responsibility must be shared too.
4
Reconstruction
Colombia just went through an enormous tragedy with the earthquake. The United States is already helping and the earthquake response is formally on Rubio's agenda. That is a starting point — not the destination. That cooperation must be used not only to rebuild what fell, but to rebuild better: infrastructure, housing, hospitals, disaster response capacity. A concrete alliance can be built there too.
"If Washington asks for results in the fight against drug trafficking, Bogotá can ask for cooperation. If Washington wants a regional ally, Colombia should ask for investment. If the U.S. wants to deepen trade, Colombia can ask for better conditions for its products. That is not confronting Trump. That is negotiating with Trump."
Cooperating Does Not Mean Obeying — The Limits of the Alliance
A closer relationship with the United States can be very good for Colombia. But every alliance needs limits. Castro identifies two that are indispensable.
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Military cooperation with technology, radars and intelligence
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Training and coordinated operations against drug trafficking
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Pacific surveillance and strengthening of Colombian military capabilities
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Intelligence cooperation in strategic zones
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Decisions about Colombian territory are made by Colombia — not Washington
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Cooperating on everything does not mean agreeing on everything: Colombia must be able to say "On this yes, on this no"
Castro notes that this is not a theoretical discussion. Military cooperation is already advancing rapidly in the Pacific and on the Ecuador border while new joint surveillance and intelligence capabilities are being studied. That is precisely why clear rules are needed.
The second limit is equally important: cooperating does not necessarily mean agreeing on everything. Trump has an agenda for Latin America. President Abelardo must have an agenda for Colombia. There will be issues where interests align perfectly — narcoterrorism, fighting organized crime, commerce, investment, security. But there will be other points where differences may emerge. When that happens, Colombia must have the capacity to say when it agrees and when it does not. And that does not weaken an alliance — it makes it more mature.
A Photo Is Not Foreign Policy — How to Measure Whether the Alliance Worked
Castro identifies two historical traps that have dominated the debate about the Colombia-United States relationship. The first: believing that everything coming from Washington is a threat. The second: believing that being close to Washington is enough to have good foreign policy. Neither works.
What Colombia Needs to Be — and What Not
❌ Automatic adversary — seeing everything from Washington as a threat
❌ Unconditional ally — saying yes to everything without negotiating anything in return
✓ Strategic partner — negotiating from its own interests, agreeing where interests align, maintaining its own position where they do not
The United States is a world power. Colombia is not. There is obviously an enormous difference in power. That is precisely why the Colombian government must know what it wants before sitting down to negotiate. The good personal relationship between Trump and President Abelardo can open many doors — but results do not come on their own.
"A photograph is not foreign policy. Results are. If in four years there is more trade, more investment, better capacity to combat drug trafficking, greater security and a stronger international relationship, the alliance will have produced results. If we can only show photographs, a historic opportunity will have been wasted."
Rubio's visit was the first official one to Colombia as Secretary of State, arriving just one month after President Abelardo's inauguration. It may be much more than diplomatic protocol — it could begin to define what kind of relationship Colombia and the United States will have over the next four years.
Castro concludes with the question that gives meaning to the entire analysis: not just what Trump wants from Colombia, but what Colombia wants for itself. If that question can be answered well, then Colombia will be ready to sit down at the table with any world power.
Frequently Asked Questions About This Episode
Why did Marco Rubio visit Colombia so soon after Abelardo's election?
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Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State, traveled to Colombia as part of a tour that also included Ecuador and Peru, arriving just weeks after the inauguration of President Abelardo de la Espreella. Castro points out that when the Secretary of State visits a new Colombian president less than two months after his election, that is not a courtesy call: it could be the beginning of a redefinition of the relationship between the two countries. The convergence of a new Colombian president with a political closeness that did not exist in previous years gives this meeting special weight.
What are Trump's three priorities regarding Colombia?
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According to Castro, Washington's three priorities are clear from the agenda announced with Rubio's visit. First, security: Colombia is a strategic piece due to its geography — coasts on both the Caribbean and Pacific, a border with Venezuela, and a central position on drug trafficking routes — making Colombia an indispensable partner regardless of who governs. Second, narcoterrorism: Washington is deliberately using the term "narcoterrorism" rather than just "drugs," which broadens the discussion to territorial control, weapons, criminal financing, and regional security. Third, commerce: the United States wants to sell, invest, access markets and have reliable supply chains in the region.
What should Colombia ask for in return in this negotiation?
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Castro identifies four concrete Colombian interests that should be on the table. First, trade and tariffs: President Abelardo already personally asked Rubio for a temporary suspension of tariffs on Colombian products. Second, investment: if Colombia is to be a strategic ally of Washington, that relationship should produce real economic results — capital, new companies, infrastructure, technology, energy and jobs. Third, reciprocal security cooperation: if Washington wants Colombia to combat criminal organizations moving billions of dollars, it must offer in return technology, radars, intelligence, air capacity, maritime control and training. Fourth, reconstruction: earthquake cooperation can be used to rebuild better — not just what fell.
Why does Castro say Colombia should be neither an unconditional ally nor an automatic adversary?
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Castro criticizes both extremes that have historically dominated the debate about the Colombia-United States relationship: those who saw everything from Washington as a threat, and those who believed being close to Washington was enough to have good foreign policy. His position is that Colombia needs to be a strategic partner, which is different from both. Being an ally does not mean giving up your own interests or saying yes to everything. Trump was elected to defend the interests of the United States — that is exactly what he should do. President Abelardo was elected to defend Colombia's interests — and that should not make anyone uncomfortable either.
What is the most important limit the alliance with the United States should have?
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For Castro, the most important limit is sovereignty. Military cooperation: yes. Intelligence: yes. Technology: yes. Training and coordinated operations against drug trafficking: of course. But decisions about Colombian territory are made by Colombia — not Washington. Castro notes this is not a theoretical discussion — military cooperation is already advancing rapidly in the Pacific and on the Ecuador border while new joint surveillance and intelligence capabilities are being studied. That is why clear rules are needed. Cooperating does not necessarily mean agreeing on everything: there will be issues where interests align perfectly and others where Colombia will have to say "On this yes, on this no."
How should we measure whether the Colombia-US alliance actually worked?
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Castro is very clear: not with photographs, speeches or declarations of friendship, but with results. If in four years there is more trade, more investment, better capacity to combat drug trafficking, greater security and a stronger international relationship, the alliance will have produced results. If in four years only photographs and declarations of friendship can be shown, a historic opportunity will have been wasted. The good personal relationship between Trump and President Abelardo can open many doors — but a photograph is not foreign policy. Results are.
About This Channel
George Castro is a Colombian-American political analyst, entrepreneur, and one of the most influential figures in the Colombian community in the United States. For decades, he has played a prominent role in civic, business, and community life, bringing together political, diplomatic, institutional, and community leaders from Colombia and the United States while remaining actively involved in issues that matter to Colombians both inside and outside the country.
As the creator of @CastrosCommonSense, Castro brings that experience to a platform for direct and independent analysis of politics, the economy, and the major issues affecting Colombia. His approach seeks to move beyond slogans and partisan loyalties to provide context, judgment, and common sense to Colombians wherever they live.
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